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The intervention brigade within the MONUSCO. 








The Intervention Brigade was established by UN Security Council 
Resolution 20981 in 2013, within the framework of the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo  (Mission de 
l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République 
démocratique du Congo – MONUSCO). MONUSCO, a UN-
commanded mission pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is 
comprised of both military and civilian components. The Brigade’s 
mandate, to employ all necessary means to ‘neutralize’ armed groups, 
goes beyond the mandate of the existing military wing of MONUSCO, 
which can be engaged in non-frontline operations (such as planning and 
coordination of military operations envisaged by the governmental forc-
es).2 Indeed, the Brigade is heralded as the first-ever offensive force un-
der the control and command of the United Nations,3 straddling the 
dynamic of peace enforcement operations in unprecedented fashion. 
This short essay will examine the question of the applicability of in-
ternational humanitarian law (IHL) to the Intervention Brigade, taking 
into account the ramifications that its distinctive mandate may entail. 
 Professor of International Law, University of Kent at Brussels. 
1
 UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) S/RES/2098. This has been renewed by UNSC 
Res 2147 (28 March 2014) S/RES/2147. 
2
 Compare T Ferraro, ‘The Applicability and Application of International 
Humanitarian law to Multinational Forces’ (2013) 95 Intl Rev Red Cross 561, 583. 
3
 S Sheeran and S Case, ‘The Intervention Brigade:  Legal Issues for the UN in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (November 2014) 2 available at 
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi_e_pub_legal_issues_drc_bri
gade.pdf>.  
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The diagnosis will first deal with issues relating to the applicability of 
IHL to UN peace forces in general. In this respect, inquiries will ad-
dress two intertwined, preliminary questions, namely:  how to deter-
mine the existence of armed conflict, international armed conflict (IAC) 
or non-international armed conflict (NIAC); and when UN peace forces 
are understood as becoming a party to the armed conflict in question. 
Consideration will then turn to specific issues that may surface when 
the ‘atypical’ mandates of the Brigade are tested against the generic 
framework of IHL surrounding the UN peace troops. 
 
 
2.  Little relevance of the distinction in the mandates to the question of 
applicability of IHL 
 
As is widely known, the UN-commanded operations can be divided 
into two types:  peacekeeping operations established under Chapter VI 
of the UN Charter; and those pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter 
(which can be termed ‘peace enforcement’ operations).4 Peacekeeping 
missions, on the one hand, are premised on three principles: consent; 
impartiality; and non-use of force save in case of self-defence.5 The de-
ployment of UN peace troops in this context has depended on the con-
sent of a territorial state.6 Now under the so-called Capstone Doctrine, 
4
 The term UN ‘peacekeeping’ is routinely used in a generic manner to encompass 
all UN peace operations (starting with the earlier peacekeeping operations created by 
the General Assembly, and covering the majority established by the Security Council, 
whether under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter:  J Sloan, ‘The Evolution 
of the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping’ (2014) 37 Journal of Strategic Studies 674, 692. 
However, this essay employs this term narrowly to refer to the operations put in place 
under Chapter VI. In contrast, here, the term UN ‘peace enforcement’ forces is reserved 
only for the Chapter VII-based multinational peace troops under UN command and 
control (excluding UN mandated forces and ‘coalition of the willing’). See, R Glick, 
‘Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and the United Nations Armed 
Forces’ (1995-6) 17 Michigan J Intl L 53, 55; R. Murphy, ‘United Nations Military 
Operations and International Humanitarian Law:  What Rules Apply to Peacekeepers?’ 
(2003) 14 Crim L Forum 153, 166-7. 
5
 The continuing validity of these three traditional elements was underscored by 
UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) UN Doc A/55/305 and S/2000/809 (21 August 
2000) ix and para 48. 
6
 Nevertheless, ONUC in Congo and UNOSOM II in Somalia were two 
outstanding cases in which the UN could not obtain the consent of host states:  K 
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the focus of appraisal has shifted to ‘the consent of the main parties to 
the conflict’.7 Insofar as this consent is valid, peacekeepers enjoy the 
protected status akin to civilians’ under IHL. Peace enforcement opera-
tions, on the other hand, founded on the authority of Chapter VII of 
the Charter, the have been undertaken without the consent of a territo-
rial (host) state.8 Generally, two interlocking consequences will ensue. 
First, the UN peace forces become a party to the conflict that is under-
way on the ground, turning their members into combatants in the jurid-
ical sense, even when they are deployed in a NIAC.9 Secondly, as a re-
sult, the IHL rules on conduct of hostilities apply to such an operation. 
However, this paper’s underlying premise is that the procedural 
question of whether peace support operations are based on Chapter VI 
or Chapter VII of the UN Charter is hardly significant for assessing the 
applicability of IHL to peacekeepers. Determining the applicability of 
IHL on the basis of the mandates of the Security Council would erode 
the assumption that issues of jus ad bellum have little bearing on the 
principle of equal application of jus in bello to parties to an armed con-
flict. This is a logical corollary of the underlying premise of IHL, which 
segregates those two branches of international law.10 Moreover, the di-
Okimoto, ‘Violations of International Humanitarian Law by United Nations Forces and 
Their Legal Consequences’ (2003) 6 YB Intl Humanitarian L 199, 217.  
7
 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines (Capstone 
Doctrine) (2008) 31-2. 
8
 G-J F van Hegelsom, ‘The Law of Armed Conflict and UN Peace-Keeping and 
Peace-Enforcing Operations’ (1993) 6 Hague YB Intl L 45, 57 (using the existence of 
consent to distinguish peacekeeping forces from peace enforcement). 
9
 This essay surmises that in a NIAC context, the notion ‘combatants’ may be 
recognized with respect to members of governmental forces, and mutatis mutandis, to 
those of UN troops. Compare J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, vol I (CUP 2005) 12 (Rule 3). 
10
 US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Trial of Wilhelm List and Others (The 
Hostages Trial) (1949) 8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals vol VIII, 59. See also 
Sassòli, ‘Ius Ad Bellum and Ius in Bello, the Separation between the legality of the use of 
Force and Humanitarian Rules to be Respected in Warfare: Crucial or Outdated?’, M 
Schmitt and J Pejic (eds), International Law and Armed Conflict (2007), at 241-264; 
Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Peace Operations, Scope of Application 
ratione materiae’, in G L Beruto (ed), International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights 
and Peace Operations, 31
st
 Round Table on Current Problems of International 
Humanitarian Law (International Institute of Humanitarian Law 2009), 100 at 103; J 
Moussa, ‘Can “Jus ad Bellum” Override “Jus in Bello”? Reaffirming the Separation of 
the Two Bodies of Law’, (2008) 90 Intl Rev Red Cross 963. 
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chotomised approach to this question, based on the distinction between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement is challenged by the operational 
reality. The very division between these two genres may be blurred in 
many instances. In volatile circumstances, there is a tendency to give 
peacekeeping operations ‘robust’ mandates to ‘use all necessary means’ 
to pursue purposes on tactical ground:  (i) deterring any forcible at-
tempts to hamper political process; (ii) shielding civilians from immi-
nent threat of physical attack; and/or (iii) helping national authorities 
maintain law and order.11 Admittedly, their use of force remains at the 
tactical level, as compared with the peace enforcement operations 
which may be mandated to deploy military force at the strategic level.12 
The use of force by ‘robust peacekeeping troops’ at the tactical level 
aims to safeguard civilians from militias or criminal gangs. Still, one is-
sue is that robust peacekeeping may involve the ‘proactive’ use of force 
to defend the mandates (including the force to ensure the environment 
for long-term peacebuilding).13 Further, even peacekeeping operations 
that are initially deployed pursuant to Chapter VI with the consent of 
the host state may be drawn into hostilities14 so that they become a party 
to the conflict.15 Such a transmutation into a de facto peace enforcement 
framework, a ‘mission-creep’ scenario,16 may be brought about by the 
deterioration of the relationship between the population in the relevant 
terrain and the peacekeeping forces. In such situations, the UN-
authorized multinational forces can be considered to have become par-
ties to the conflict, calling into play the normative paradigm of IHL re-
11




 There is a suggestion that such a ‘proactive’ use of force seen in robust 
peacekeeping may even justify pre-emptive or offensive use of force:  T Findlay, The 
Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (OUP 2002) 14-15, 74 and 356. 
14
 Apart from the ONUC discussed here, note should be taken of UNOSOM II, 
which was authorized by Security Council Resolution 837 of 6 June 1993, adopted 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to take ‘all necessary measures against all those 
responsible for the armed attack’ on UNSOM II personnel. R Kolb, ‘Background 
Document 1:  Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Forces under the 
Command of an International Organisation’, in A Faite and J Labbé Grenier, Report to 
the Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations, Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces (ICRC 
2004) 68. 
15
 Murphy (n 4) 184-5; Sloan (n 4) 675, 694. 
16
 ibid 685-90. 
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lating to conduct of hostilities.17 To propose otherwise would be coun-
terfactual. It also may well be that de jure, the mandate for a peacekeep-
ing mission is transformed, over time, into a full-blown Chapter VII-
based enforcement operation.18 The so-called ‘widened peacekeeping’ 
missions, as in the case of UN Operation in the Congo (Opération des 
Nations Unies au Congo – ONUC) in Katanga province,19 may create a 
grey area verging on peace enforcement. Moreover, multinational forces 
may be equipped with ‘hybrid mandates’ derived from both Chapters 
VI and VII.20 In all those circumstances, it is reasonable that upon be-
coming parties to the conflict, the UN-based multinational forces be di-
vested of the civilian protection they have been granted.21  
Overall, this paper submits that determining the applicability of 
IHL depends entirely on the specific factual events on the ground. The 
gist is to verify the existence (eruption or continuation) of hostilities.22 
While peacekeepers may be vested with the mandate to use force purely 
for a self-defensive purpose, or with a view to defending the mandated 
mission, their actual recourse to force may reveal a varying level of 
force.23 Irrespective of this, whenever defensive measures invoked by 
peacekeeping forces have brought about an armed confrontation reach-
ing the level of an armed conflict, this should be considered to trigger 
the application of IHL on conduct of hostilities.24  
 
17
 ibid 565.  
18
 M Cottier, ‘Attacks on Humanitarian Assistance or Peacekeeping Missions’ in  O 
Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:  
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Beck/Hart 1999) 187, 195. Such an adjustment is 
salutary to avoid the charge of ultra-vires. 
19
 The ICJ, in its advisory opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations 
(Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), found that ONUC was not an enforcement 
action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  Certain Expenses of the United Nations 
(Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) >1962@ ICJ Rep 151, 166. 
Yet, it can be averred that the Security Council implicitly invoked Chapter VII, because 
Resolution 161 of 21 February 1961 and  Resolution 169 of 24 November 1961 granted 
ONUC the authority to take ‘all appropriate measures’ and to use necessary force 
within the parameters of self-defence:  Sloan (n 4) 686. 
20
 Murphy (n 4) 186; Ferraro (n 2) 565.  
21
 Cottier (n 18) 195. 
22
 Ferraro (n 2) 565, 573; and O Engdahl, ‘A Rebuttal to Eric David’ (2014) 95 Intl 
Rev Red Cross 667, at 669. 
23
 Sloan (n 4) 675-6, 687, 691. 
24
 Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law’ (n 10) 103. 
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3. Determining the existence of armed conflict  
 
Generally, in cases where UN peacekeeping forces intervene to fight 
against armed forces of a territorial state, this constitutes an IAC.25 The 
rationale is that the two opposing parties are entities that enjoy interna-
tional legal personalities.26 In contrast, when multinational forces in-
cluding UN peacekeepers are involved in clashes against one or more 
non-state armed groups, or to combat against such insurgent groups 
alongside or in support of armed forces of a host state, this can be clas-
sified as a NIAC.27 However, there is a policy-oriented view that be-
cause of the inadequacy of IHL rules on NIAC, the mere involvement 
of a multinational force should internationalize the nature of armed con-
flict,28 or that UN peace forces must observe IHL rules on IAC irrespec-
tive of the legal characterisation of the conflict.29 Yet, this paper argues 
that the simple presence of multinational forces under the UN Security 
Council’s mandate does not transmogrify the multinational NIAC into 
an IAC,30 and that in customary IHL there is a tendency to converge the 
rules applicable to NIACs and those applicable to IACs.  
For the purpose of ascertaining if there exists an NIAC, analysis 
should focus on three criteria. First, as laid down in Article 1(2) Addi-
tional Protocol II (APII) and Article 8(2)(d) Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (Rome Statute), violence must reach a mini-
mum level of intensity that exceeds the level of internal disturbances 
and tensions that are commonly observable in case of riots, isolated and 
25
 Engdahl (n 22) 672, 674. 
26
 Ferraro (n 2) 596. 
27
 See, for instance, ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of 
Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, Report for the 31
 
International Conference of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent  (October 2011) 10. 
28
 See, for instance, Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law’ (n 10) 100; E David, 
‘How Does the Involvement of a Multinational Peacekeeping Force Affect the 
Classification of a Situation’ (2013) 95 Intl Rev Red Cross 659, 661 and 665. 
29
 See Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law’ (n 10) 104; and J Saura, ‘Lawful 
Peacekeeping:  Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations’ (2007) 58 Hastings L J 479, 513. 
30
 For the same view, see E Wilmshurst, ‘Conclusions’ in E Wilmshurst (ed), 
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sporadic acts of violence.31 The threshold for assessing the occurrence 
of a NIAC may be considered higher than that for evaluating an IAC 
under common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions (GCs),32 the provi-
sion that attaches less importance to the criteria of duration and intensi-
ty of hostilities.33 Still, this understanding is tempered by a ‘tendency’ to 
lower the threshold of intensity required for ascertaining the existence 
of a NIAC within the meaning of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions.34 Second, while not spelt out in the conventional text it-
self, it is implicitly assumed that for a NIAC to be identified, an armed 
opposition group must attain a certain level of organisation.35 The ele-
ment of organisation is crucial for an armed group to implement mili-
tary operations in accordance with IHL rules.36 Third, there is contro-
versy over whether NIACs must be of sufficient duration. Article 8(2)(f) 
Rome Statute explains that NIACs within the meaning of Article 8(2)(e) 
must be ‘protracted’, as affirmed in Tadi ü by the ICTY.37 For all the 
contrary inference that may be drawn from the travaux prépratoires,38 
the absence of the express renvoi to the category of NIACs contemplat-
ed in Article 8(2)(d) favours the argument that the Rome Statute as-
sumes not a unified notion of NIACs but two distinct genres of them: 
the one contemplated by Article 8(2)(d) Rome Statute (and common 
Article 3 GCs), which undercuts the significance of the temporal re-
quirement; and the other envisaged by Article 8(2)(e) Rome Statute, 
which must be of ‘protracted’ nature. Even supposing that this tem-
poral criterion is necessary, this does not necessitate a ‘sustained’ or 
31
 K Grenfell, ‘Perspective on the Applicability and Application of International 
Humanitarian Law:  the UN Context’ (2013) 95 Intl Rev Red Cross 645, 647. 
32
 S Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law:  Legal 
Concepts and Actual Situations’ (2009) 91 Intl Rev Red Cross 69, 76. 
33
 Ferraro (n 2) 575-6. 
34
 Vité (n 32) 81-2; O Engdahl, ‘The Status of Peace Operation Personnel under 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 11 YB Intl Humanitarian L 117. 
35
 J Pejic, ‘The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More Than Meets the Eye’ 
(2011) 93 Intl Rev Red Cross 1, 3-4, 11 and 35. 
36
 Prosecutor v Limaj et al (Judgment) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) 90; and 
Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al (Judgment) IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008) para 60. 
37
 Prosecutor v Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) ICTY-94-1-A (2 October 1995) para 70.  
38
 Vité (n 32) 81, n 49. 
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‘continuous’ military operation.39 It can involve repeated or intermittent 
armed confrontations straddling some lulls.40 In that light, the UN 
peacekeepers’ defensive force against sporadic attacks by an armed 
group may cross a lower hurdle of NIACs within the meaning of Article 
8(2)(d) Rome Statute, but also the hurdle applicable for NIACs under 
Article 8(2)(e) Rome Statute.41 
 
 
4.  Implications of the UN Safety Convention 
 
The 1994 UN Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and 
Associated Personnel appears to distinguish between enforcement ac-
tion on one hand, and what it defines as a ‘United Nations operation’ 
on the other. Article 2(2) makes clear that it does not apply to ‘a United 
Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an enforce-
ment action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in 
which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against orga-
nized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict 
applies’. This exclusion clause raises questions as to the parameters of 
UN peace operations that are debarred from the coverage of the Con-
vention.  
On careful inspection, one finds that Article 2(2) does not speak of 
all forms of peace enforcement operations. The enforcement operations 
mentioned in that paragraph are attended by the strings consisting of 
three normative elements: (i) engagement of the UN personnel as ‘com-
batants’; (ii) fighting against ‘organized armed forces’; and (iii) applica-
tion of the law of international armed conflict (IAC). With respect to 
(i), it should be remarked that not all peace enforcement troops get in-
volved in actual fighting.42 It is not inconceivable that hostilities in the 
39
 S Boelaert-Suominen, ‘Commentary:  the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Common 
Core of Humanitarian Law Applicable to All Conflicts’ (2000) 13 Leiden J Intl L 619, at 
634-5. 
40
 Ferraro (n 2) 579. 
41
 Kolb (n 14) 68. Contra, Prosecutor v Sesay et al (RUF Case) (Judgment) SCSL-04-
15-T (2 March 2009) para 233; Prosecutor v Abu Garda (Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges) ICC-02/05-02/09 (8 February 2010) para 83.  
42
 Ferraro (n 2) 565, n 9 (referring to the EU forces deployed in the DRC in 2003, 
which was an enforcement action authorized under Security Council Resolution 1484, 
but was not drawn into hostilities and hence not subject to IHL). 
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territory may have subsided by the time that the peace enforcement 
troops are deployed, or even that these forces end up staying out of hos-
tilities. Clearly, in those circumstances, the peace enforcement forces 
fall short of constituting ‘parties to the hostilities’.  
As regards (ii) and (iii), on the face of it, Article 2(2) seems to pre-
clude the application of the Safety Convention where UN enforcement 
troops are confronted with ‘organized armed forces’ in the conflict reg-
ulated by ‘the law of international armed conflict’. The literary con-
struction might suggest that the UN enforcement troops are bereft of 
protection under the Safety Convention only when involved in IACs.43 
Accordingly, it might be argued that the applicability of the Safety Con-
vention is preserved in relation to UN peace enforcement forces de-
ployed in NIACs so that it would be a crime to launch attacks against 
them.44 On this reading, the breadth of application of the Safety Con-
vention would not be limited to Chapter VI-based peacekeeping opera-
tions. However, ostensibly, this is incongruent. This dissonance can be 
explained by the fact that when the Safety Convention was adopted, the 
drafters did not envisage peace enforcement to take shape in the con-
text of NIACs.45 For the sake of systemic interpretation, Article 2(2) of 
the Safety Convention should be considered to foreclose peace en-
forcement operations conducted in NIACs as well. 
 
 4.1. Repercussions of the saving clause of the UN Safety Convention 
 
The thesis that the UN Safety Convention and IHL are mutually ex-
clusive normative regimes appears irreconcilable with the savings claus-
es of the Safety Convention (Article 20). Article 20(a) stipulates that 
nothing in the Convention shall affect ‘the applicability of international 
humanitarian law and universally recognized standards of human rights 
as contained in international instruments in relation to the protection of 
United Nations operations and United Nations and associated person-
nel or the responsibility of such personnel to respect such law and 
standards’. The crux of the matter is how to read this provision consist-
ently with Article 2(2). First, it may be argued that this saving clause 
43
 Grenfell (n 31) 650. 
44
 Engdahl (n 22) 672.  
45
 Sheeran and Case (n 3) 11. 
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does not add anything new to Article 2(2) of the Convention.46 Accord-
ing to this interpretation, the normative impact of Article 20(a) is only 
‘declaratory’. This clause is considered merely to reiterate that UN mili-
tary personnel must respect IHL where the Convention is not applica-
ble under Article 2(2). In contrast, the second view suggests that not-
withstanding Article 2(2), the saving clause under Article 20(a) does en-
visage the concurrent application of IHL and the Safety Convention.47 
There is even an assertion that the mutually non-exclusive nature of 
IHL and the Safety Convention, not only in NIAC but in the IAC con-
text is inferable from the negotiations leading up to the adoption of Ar-
ticle 20(a) and from the textual tenor of the Safety Convention (Article 
8 in particular).48 
 
 4.2.  Reconciling the UN Safety Convention with the applicability of 
IHL to UN peace forces 
 
The problem with the convergent application of IHL and the Safety 
Convention to UN peacekeeping forces is that it may give rise to asym-
metrical consequences. The UN peace mission’s military personnel may 
be caught in recurrent defensive operations against non-state armed 
groups. Yet, under the Safety Convention, it is unlawful for such groups 
to deliver attacks against the UN personnel, with the attendant risk of 
incurring criminal responsibility. This would strain the efficacy of the 
principle that IHL must apply equally to the parties to the conflict.49 
This invidious outcome would give them little incentive to abide by 
IHL.50 To overcome this, it is important, as proposed above, to recog-
nise that using force in self-defence may in certain situations trigger hos-
tilities, so that even UN peacekeeping troops may become parties to the 
conflict as ‘combatants’ bound by IHL rules.51 Indeed, the viability of 
46
 M Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff 
2005) 171. 
47
 C Bourloyannis-Vrailas, ‘The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel’ (1995) 44 ICLQ 561, 583-584; and Murphy (n 4) 186-7. 
48
 A Bouvier, ‘Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel:  Presentation and Analysis’ (1995) 35 Intl Rev Red Cross 638, 663. 
49
 See A Roberts, ‘The Equal Application of the Laws of War: a Principle Under 
Pressure’ (2008) 90 Intl Rev Red Cross 931, 952-956. 
50
 Compare ibid 948 and 955; and Sassòli, ‘International Humanitarian Law’ 105-6. 
51
 Murphy (n 4) 185-8. 
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this approach is borne out by Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and (e)(iii) Rome Stat-
ute, which makes the materialisation of the relevant war crimes condi-
tional upon the entitlement of the UN peacekeeping personnel to civil-
ian protections under IHL.  
As one author has suggested, the effect of Article 2(2) of the UN 
Safety Convention ‘is that the threshold for the application of interna-
tional humanitarian law is also the ceiling for the application of the 
Convention’.52 This strand of argument is predicated on the hypothesis 
that the Safety Convention and IHL are mutually exclusive. However, 
this must be refuted in that the correlation between the Safety Conven-
tion and IHL is more intricate and strained.    
This essay proposes that the typology of this relationship be dis-
cerned in four patterns:  (i) the ‘calm’ situations where self-defensive 
measures opted for by peacekeepers fall short of reaching the threshold 
of an armed conflict (be it IAC or NIAC) and where the Safety Conven-
tion applies; (ii) the ‘volatile’ non-enforcement context in which the co-
application of the Safety Convention and IHL is feasible; (iii) the IAC 
context in which UN peace enforcement troops that have been de-
ployed fail to be engaged ‘as combatants’,53 or the NIAC context in 
which intervening UN peace enforcement forces fail to be involved in 
combat operations, so that the application of the Safety Convention 
(where appropriate, jointly with the body of IHL rules regulating occu-
pation,) is not excluded;54 (iv) the enforcement context in which UN 
forces have actually been embroiled in a combat operation, the context 
that Article 2(2) specifically considers beyond the purview of applica-






  C Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military 
Operations’ (1998) 1 YB Intl Humanitarian L 3, 16, 24 25. See also International Law 
Association, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law, 
Committee on the Use of Force (The Hague, 2010) 17. 
53
 Being ‘engaged as combatants against organized armed forces’ is a proviso 
contained in Article 2(2) of the Safety Convention. 
54
 See, however, Murphy (n 4) 186-7 (suggesting that the Safety Convention apply 
to peace enforcement operations as deployed in Somalia). 
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5. When the UN peace operations are considered to become a party to an 
armed conflict – UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on observance by 
UN forces of IHL 
 
The UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Na-
tions Forces of International Humanitarian Law (1999)55 recognises the 
need for multinational forces conducting operations under UN com-
mand and control to comply with ‘fundamental principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law’.56 It states that these principles and 
rules are applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping opera-
tions when the use of force is allowed in self-defence. In terms of the 
ambit of application ratione materiae, the Bulletin57 sets forth the fun-
damental rules and principles of IHL, without differentiating between 
IAC and NIAC. Yet, for the purpose of ascertaining the applicability of 
IHL, the UN has devised a criterion that is distinct from the threshold 
applicable to any other groups involved in armed conflict. Section 1.1 of 
the Bulletin enunciates that: 
 
‘The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian 
law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations 
forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged 
therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their en-
gagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or 
in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-
defence’. 
 
The second sentence of Section 1.1. includes the adverb ‘according-
ly’ to clarify that the application of IHL to ‘peacekeeping operations 
when the use of force is permitted in self-defence’ is contingent upon 
meeting the proviso in the first sentence that ‘in situations of armed 
conflict they [UN peace operation forces] are actively engaged therein as 
55
 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of 
International Humanitarian Law (6 August 1999) UN Doc ST/SGB/1999/13 
(hereinafter ‘Bulletin’).  
56
 ibid. See also Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee 
on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations - Report 
of the Secretary-General (1 June 2001) A/55/977 (so-called Brahimi Report) 59. 
57
 The Bulletin refers only to general principles derived from the Geneva Law and 
the Hague Law. 
 
 
The intervention brigade within the MONUSCO                                                              17 
 
combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement’.58 
Hence, the applicability of IHL rules is subject to the criterion ‘active 
engagement as combatants’.  
One salient effect of the Bulletin’s criterion is to endorse a higher 
threshold for ascertaining the existence of armed conflict when UN 
peacekeepers are involved.59 Generally, at what point armed forces have 
become a party to an armed conflict and therefore attract the applica-
tion of IHL is a question of factual and hence ‘declaratory’ nature. 
However, in the case of UN peacekeeping forces under Chapter VI, an 
inquiry into empirical data is needed to address the two interlocking 
preliminary questions:  if there is an armed confrontation involving a 
sufficient level of intensity;60 and if they have become a party to the con-
flict. This prerequisite helps differentiate defensive action in hostilities 
from self-defence in law enforcement scenarios. Accordingly, as com-
pared with enforcement action that often (though certainly not always) 
presupposes that there is an ongoing armed conflict in which UN peace 
troops are deployed, the determination of an armed conflict can be rat-
ed as a question of ‘constitutive’ nature, in the event of peacekeepers 
resorting to self-defence measures.61 Along this line, Shraga, who has 
helped draft the Bulletin, stresses the importance of identifying the ex-
istence of an armed conflict (of whatever nature) as a criterion for ascer-
taining applicability of IHL to UN peace forces.62 One spinoff argument 
is that this extra criterion requires that ‘the conflict had to be ongoing 
prior to their deployment’, so that the level for assessing when IHL 
binds UN forces may be further heightened.63 Still, this essay submits 
that the application of IHL to UN peace forces be recognised whenever 
they are caught up, before or after their deployment, in armed confron-
tations that have risen to the level of an armed conflict.  
58
 Bulletin (n 55) s.1.1, emphasis added. 
59
 Ferraro (n 2) 580-1. 
60




 D Shraga, ‘The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Peace 
Operations, from Rejection to Acceptance’, in Beruto (n 10) 90, 94 (arguing that this is 
one of the two cumulative conditions (‘double-key’ test), apart from the condition of 
‘active engagement as combatants’). 
63
 Ferraro (n 2) 581-2, emphasis added. See also M Zwanenburg, ‘The Secretary 
General’s Bulletin on Observance by UN Forces of IHL:  a Pyrrhic Victory?’ (2000) 
Military L and L War Rev 14, 21. 
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 5.1.  Criticisms against the Bulletin’s criterion 
 
The Bulletin fails to adduce guidelines on how the criterion ‘active 
engagement as combatants’ can be assessed together with the prelimi-
nary issues relating to the identification of an armed conflict as gov-
erned by common Articles 2 and 3 GCs (respectively for IAC and 
NIAC).64 Moreover, it may be asked if the conceptual boundaries of the 
term ‘combatants’ in the Bulletin are qualified, due to its linkage to the 
notion ‘active engagement’, which entails the effect of delimiting the 
temporal span. Put differently, the question is if the concept ‘combat-
ants’ would take on different (and narrower) meanings when applied to 
UN peace forces. Further, assuming that the Bulletin confines the tem-
poral scope of application of IHL to the duration of active engagement, 
this span proves to be more restrictive than that contemplated in Arti-
cles 43-44 Additional Protocol I (API). The expression ‘active engage-
ment’ indicates only the period in which they are involved in fighting 
(or directly participating in hostilities). Plausibly, it intimates that the 
protected status of UN peace troops is, akin to the ICRC’s approach to 
civilians taking a direct part in hostilities,65 recoverable once the en-
gagement is over.66 The Bulletin may be read as suggesting that the ap-
plication of IHL ceases upon the termination of their combat mission, 
even though the armed conflict on the ground persists.67 The limited 
temporal parameters of ‘combatant’ status of UN peace forces were en-
dorsed by some war crimes tribunals.68 However, this approach betrays 
a confusion between the temporal limit of civilians directly participating 
in hostilities with the notion of ‘combatants’ into which the soldiers of 
64
 Ferraro (n 2) 581. 
65
 See also ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hos-
tilities Under International Humanitarian Law (2009) 70; see also D Akande, ‘Clearing 
the Fog of War? – The ICRC’s Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2010) 
59 ICLQ 180, 189-91. 
66
 Sheeran and Case (n 3) 8. 
67
 D Shraga, ‘The Secretary General’s Bulletin on the Observance by UN Forces of 
International Humanitarian Law: A Decade Later’ (2009) 39 Israel YB Human Rights 
358-9. See also Ferraro (n 2) 604. 
68
 Prosecutor v Abu Garda (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC 02/05-
02/09 (8 February 2010) para 83; Prosecutor v Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourrain et al 
(Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC 02/05-03/09 (7 March 2011) para 66; 
and Prosecutor v Sasay et al. (Judgment) SCSL 04-15-T (2 March 2009) para 233. 
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UN peace missions (have come to) turn.69 This essay asserts that the UN 
forces are governed by IHL until and unless their forces cease to be a 
party to the armed conflict, as at a general close of military operations.70  
  
 
6.  Applicability of IHL to the Intervention Brigade  
 
Within the framework of peace enforcement, the military compo-
nent of MONUSCO is tasked with the mandate to employ force against 
armed groups, albeit its involvement in hostilities is confined only for 
the purpose of protecting civilians.71 In contrast, the mandate assigned 
to the Intervention Brigade is distinguishable, transcending the horizon 
of these peace enforcement operations. Security Council Resolution 
2098 expressly states that the Brigade be engaged to support one party 
to the armed conflict(s) (the governmental forces, the FARDC) in ‘tar-
geted offensive operations’ against armed opposition groups.72 The gist 
of the legal implication is that vested with a specific ‘responsibility of 
neutralizing’ non-state armed groups, the Brigade is purported to be-
come an active party to an armed conflict, with its members as combat-
ants. Two overarching objectives of the Brigade are: (i) ‘contributing to 
reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civil-
ian security in eastern DRC’; and (ii) ‘mak[ing] space for stabilization 
activities’.73 It is pursuant to these general objectives that the Interven-
tion Brigade’s remit is extended to cover action of offensive nature, 
namely, neutralizing and disarming armed groups.74  
69
 This conflation undermines the ‘mutual exclusiveness’ of the distinction between 
‘spontaneous, sporadic or unorganised action carried out by civilians’ and the 
‘continuous and status-based or function-based loss of protection’ for armed forces:  
Ferraro (n 2) 605.  
70
 ibid 606-7. 
71
 Sheeran and Case (n 3) 1. 
72
 This leaves questions of legitimacy for the Congolese in the areas under non-state 
governance:  A Ponthieu, C Vogel, K Derderian, ‘Without Precedent or Prejudice? – 
UNSC Resolution 2098 and its Potential Implications for Humanitarian Space in 
Eastern Congo and Beyond’ (21 January 2014) J Humanitarian Assistance, available at 
<http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/2032>. 
73
 UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098, operative paras 9 and 
12(b). 
74
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Empirically, there is hardly any question about the parallel existence 
of several NIACs in the DRC. Moreover, the Brigade, conceived as it 
was as a special combat force, has succeeded in routing the M23 re-
bels.75 This factual evidence alone is sufficient to arrive at the conclu-
sion that the Brigade has become a party to the armed conflict, with its 
members being fully-fledged combatants and bound by IHL. Being ac-
tively engaged in combat operations, these members have also satisfied 
the requirement for the triggering of the application of IHL as envis-
aged in the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin. As a corollary, they are ex-
cluded from the protection of the Safety Convention.76 However, when 
authorising the establishment of the Intervention Brigade in 2013 (and 
renewing its mandate in Resolution 2147 in 2014), the Council mis-
judged the ramifications of the Safety Convention on the question of 
applicability of IHL. In the preamble, Resolution 2098 highlighted the 
need to bring to justice those responsible for attacks against the 
MONUSCO peace troops.77 This unmasks the Council’s remissness in 
overlooking that MONUSCO peace forces deployed pursuant to en-
forcement action became combatants as a party to the conflicts.78   
The Intervention Brigade might feel justified, in its mandate, in giv-
ing primacy to defeating armed groups. If so, this would depart from 
the hitherto consistent policy of the MONUC and MONUSCO in ac-
cording the safeguarding of civilians ‘the highest priority’. A perturbing 
implication of the Brigade’s mandates is that the objective of ‘neutraliz-
ing’ armed groups might be sought at the expense of the hitherto sacro-
sanct mandate to ensure the safety of civilian population.79 However, 
the introduction of this special force is designed to remedy the deficien-
cy of the ‘regular’ MONUSCO force in achieving the protection-of-
civilian mandate. Against the backdrop of the reluctance of some troop 
contributing countries (TCCs) to risking the security of their troops, the 
‘Protection of Civilians in International Humanitarian Law and by the Use of Force 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’ (2008-11) 4 Asia-Pacific YB 
Intl Humanitarian L 1, 59. 
75
 N Kulish and S Sengupta, ‘New U.N. Brigade’s Aggressive Stance in Africa 
Brings Success, and Risks’, New York Times (12 November 2013). 
76
 Sheeran and Case (n 3) 11-12.  
77
 UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098, preamble. 
78
 Security Council, Press Statement on Democratic Republic of Congo (29 August 
2013) UN Doc SC/11108. 
79
 Compare Sheeran and Case (n 3) 17.  
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Security Council’s resolve to reinforce the protection of civilians was 
confirmed by Resolution 2147 (2014), which lowered the threshold for 
resorting to use of force to protect civilians. This resolution dispensed 
with the condition requiring the ‘imminence’ of a threat,80 the condition 
contained in similar circumstances elsewhere,81 enabling the Interven-
tion Brigade to take preventive measures to forestall attacks against ci-
vilians.82 Reportedly, the Brigade’s military operations against M23 and 
ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) have not culminated in major civilian 
casualties or humanitarian displacement.83 In contrast, its ongoing of-
fensives against APCLS are considered more hazardous in that they 
have enmeshed MONUSCO in a much more volatile area.84 
  
 
7. The personal scope of application of IHL to the Intervention Brigade 
 
The UN peace missions are often made up of a mosaic of organisa-
tions comprised of military, civilian and police personnel. The general 
assumption is that IHL applies only to the military components when 
they become a party to an armed conflict. In contrast, with respect to 
international civilian personnel, they are protected as civilians under 
IHL, unless they are considered to participate directly in hostilities.85  
To examine whether the Intervention Brigade can be considered a 
party to the conflict(s) in the DRC, three strands of thought can be put 
forward. First, it may be suggested that the MONUSCO as a whole be 
seen as a party to the conflict. This across-the-board approach is bol-
stered by the fact that the Brigade falls under the command and control 
80
 See UNSC Res 2147 (28 March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147, operative para 4(a). 
81
 See, for instance, UNSC Res 1975 (30 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1975, 
operative para 6; and UNSC Res 2100 (25 April 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2100, para 
16(c)(i). 
82
 See also Sheeran and Case (n 3) 18.  
83
 C Vogel, ‘DRC:  Assessing the Performance of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention 
Brigade’, in African Arguments blog posted on 14 July 2014, available by a link from 
<http://africanarguments.org>. 
84
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sensitive:  ibid. 
85
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of the MONUSCO Force Commander.86 The Brigade is not formed as a 
distinct legal entity. Even on operations, its members act within a single 
military force (clad in the identical UN emblems and blue helmets) and 
under a single force commander, whilst relying on the same military ba-
ses and logistics as other MONUSCO troops.87 Article 2(2) of the UN 
Safety Convention might be interpreted as corroborating this approach, 
excluding in toto the application of this treaty and depriving even non-
military personnel of UN peace missions of special protection, once any 
UN personnel are engaged as combatants.88 However, this overall ap-
proach squarely runs counter to the general assumption outlined imme-
diately above. Further, a pitfall is that the civilian personnel, who con-
stitute the minority of the MONUSCO staff, are exposed to the risk of 
direct attacks, as they are stationed in the bases used by the Intervention 
Brigade and other MONUSCO troops.89  
Secondly, it may be asserted that apart from the Intervention Bri-
gade, only the military personnel of the MONUSCO should be deemed 
combatants when actively engaged in hostilities. Thirdly, as a variant of 
the second view, one may call for an even more nuanced analysis, dif-
ferentiating between the units of ‘regular forces’ of MONUSCO which 
are engaged in combat operations alongside or in support of the Bri-
gade, and the units of the military personnel focusing on humanitarian 
relief operations. According to this approach, those ‘regular’ military 
units dealing with tasks which are short of combat operations would be 
classified as civilians under IHL.90 Together with the Brigade, only the 
former category of the military personnel would become a party to the 
armed conflicts.91 Nevertheless, such a nuanced approach is riddled 
with complex empirical evaluations, dissuading armed opposition 
86
 B O Oswald, ‘The Security Council and the Intervention Brigade:  Some Legal 
Issues’ (2013) 17 ASIL Insights 15 (6 June 2013). 
87
 Sheeran and Case (n 3) 9, 10. Compare Engdahl (n 22) 671 (arguing that ‘the 
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armed conflict, since it does not possess the necessary independence from the subjects 
of international law of either troop-contributing states, or the involved organisations’). 
88
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groups to observe the principle of distinction or the IHL rules in gen-
eral. It is more reasonable to assert that the entire military contingent, 
irrespective of diverse functions which each of specific units may as-
sume, should be governed by IHL upon the active participation of the 
military in hostilities.92 
 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding the Security Council’s circumspection in stating 
that it is created ‘on an exceptional basis and without creating a prece-
dent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping’,93 the 
Intervention Brigade will leave an indelible imprint in the historical tra-
jectory of peace enforcement operations as the first UN peace mission 
of overtly offensive nature. Relative clarity over the applicability of IHL 
to the Brigade (whether based on the Safety Convention or on the UN 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin) may be contrasted to uncertainty sur-
rounding the line between the Brigade and the ‘regular’ force, and the 
personal ambit of application of IHL to the different components (mili-
tary, civil and police personnel) of MONUSCO. Such opacity in the al-
location of powers and duties may hamper the operational efficacy of 
this peace mission tasked with multi-dimensional mandates.94 It is rec-
ommended that the Security Council elucidate the legal direction on 
these overarching issues,95 and on other unresolved questions such as 
the detention of fighting members of armed groups, and the distribu-
tion of responsibility between the UN and the TCCs for violations of 
IHL and human rights perpetrated by Brigade members. 
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